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the testator was subject to delusions, but was
for the court to say to the jury that
they were to decide "not whether the peculiar views of the testator were
scriptural or otherwise, sensible or absurd, but simply whether or not
tliiy so iinpressed his mind, became, as it were, so incorporated into his
mental constitution as to control his judgment in regard to the use and
dispositi6n of his property, so as to prevent his perceiving or appreciating the odinaLry duty he owes to his family, or their claims upon him as
a'faitfer in that respect." The court also saying that if the evidence did
not faiily lead to the conclusion that the testator's mind was overpowered
and controlled by his peculiar views so as to prevent him from exercising
a reasonable or rational judgment in relation to the disposition of his
property, their verdict should be in favor of the will, however, absurd,
ridiculous or unfounded they might individually or collectively believe
his peculiar views on faith and its effects to have been.
Where it wais claimed tat

otherwise si6ne it is not improper
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The view of a will, which regards it as conferring the
power of diverting property from the family of the testator or
of distributing such property unequally, is

modern.

Early

custom did not look with favor upon the disinherison of the
heir; the connection was too close between the succession
to property after death and the performance of the sacrificial
rites in honor of the deceased that probably had their origin
in ancestor worship (Maine's Early Law and Custom, 78).
At the Roman law what actually passed from the testator.to

-
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the heir was the family, that isthe aggregate of rights and
duties contained in the para potestas. It was possible by the
law of the twelve tables for the testator to exhaust his entire
patrimony in legacieS, leaving his instituted heir nothing but
the bare title (Gaius L. II., tit. xxiii. Nasmith's Outline, 270).
Historical writers have occasionally fallen into the error of
assuming an injurious license of disinherisoh indulged in by
heads of families (Montesquien Lib. XXVII., ch. i). The
indications, however, are that a will was not customarily regarded by the Romans as a means of disinheriting a family or
of effecting the unequal distribution of a patrimony. The
rules of law preventing such action increase in stringency as
the system of jurisprudence is perfected. The testamentary
power had become valued for the assistance it gave in enabling the testator to make an even and fair provision for his
real family, emancipated as well as uneniancipated, cognati
as well as agnati (Maine's Ancient Law, 21 I).
A will, in which the testator unreasonably passed over his
nearest relations in order to make over his property to
strangers, was thought to argue a lack of natural affection
and was called an " undutiful will." The relations passed
over were entitled to have the tFestament declared null and
void, on the ground that the testator was of unsound mind
when the testament was made, on bringing an action de inofficioso testamento. The action could be brought by the children, if there were none by the ascendants, and, failing these
by the brothers and sisters, but in the last case only when the
person instituted was of bad character (tzurpis). (Morey's
Outline of Roman Law, 327; Campbell's Compendium, 85.)
In the words 9f the code this does not mean that the testator
was really insane, but that the testament, though regularly
made, is inconsistent with the duty of affection the parent
owes, for if the testator is really insane at the time, the testament is null (Code of Justinian, Lib. II., tit. xviii. Saunder's
Ed). The fiction insanity (color insaniae) declares Sohm " is
probably due to the reception of the Greek lav. In the early
Attic law we find precisely the same form for impeaching an
unduteous will as in Rome, the testator being accused by his
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relatives of flavia" (c. p. Schulin 1.c. p. 16). There is
reason for believing that the Greeks went further in their
recognition of claims to a statutory share than the Roman
centumviral court (Sohm Institutes Lib. III., ch. ii, § IOO, iii).
The statutory share to which an heir succeeded by necessity called the portio legitinza was fixed by the i8th Novel of
Justinian at one-third of the intestacy share when the number
of heirs was four or less, and at one-half the intestacy share
when the number of heirs was greater than four. Where the
heir received something under the will but not enough he
was required to proceed by actio in supplementum legitimae.
Justinian's most important reform, however, was accomplished
by the I 15th novel. By this ascendants are required to institute as heirs such of their descendants as would succeed on
intestacy and vice versa. Disinherison was permitted only for
certain definite statutory reasons to be expressly stated in the
testament (Salkowski's Roman Law Lib. III., pt. iv., § 17o;
Sohm Inst. 466). These reasons are described by the term
"ingratitude."
Examples are an attempt on the life of the
tes:ator, cruelty to him or refusal of subsistence: (Mackeldey's
Roman Law, § 738; Code Napoleon, §§ 955, lO46, 1047;
Civil Code of Louisiana, H9 1559-1562). In Bosworth v.
Beiller, 2 La. Ann., 293, it was held that a parent could disinherit a child for marrying without his consent.
"The law of England," declares Blackstone, "makes no
such constrained suppositions of insanity or forgetfulness, and,
therefore, though the heir or next of kin be totally omitted,
it admits no querela inoficiosi to set aside such a testament ":
Bl. Comm., Bk. II., p. 503. While, perhaps, no person was
bound by the general law of the kingdom to leave anything
by will to any particular person, local customs did lay restrictions upon the testamentary power. One of these commonly
was to remember his lord with his best chattel, then the
church and after these he might dispose of the remainder at
pleasure (Glanville Lib. VII, c. 5., Bracton, 60). Another
division, in accordance with the custom of gavelkind, is cited
by Finalson. Says the costumal of Kent: "Let the goods of
gavelkind persons be divided into three parts after the funeral
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and debts paid. So that the dead shall have one part and the
lawful sons and daughters another and the wife the third, and,
if there be no lawful issue, let the dead have one-half and the
wife the other" (Finalson's Reeves' History of English Law,
Vol. I, p. 329).

The share of the wife and children were

called their reasonable parts and the writ de rationabili.arte
bononum was given to recover them. The right to the reasonable part was expressly reserved in Ynagnza charta, and
Blackstone is of the opinion that this was the common law of
the land in the reign of Edward III. (Bl. Comm. II., p. 492).
Sir Henry S. Maine attributes the growth of freedom in testamentary power to the influence of primogeniture "as the
Feudal law of land practically disinherited all the children in
favor of one, the equal distribution even of those sorts of
property, which might have been equally divided ceased to be
viewed as a duty" (Maine's Ancient Law, 218).
It is interesting to note that in the reign of Edward VI,
a commission was appointed to reform the ecclesiastical law.
This commission met in 1552, carried on and completed its
work, but before it received the royal confirmation the young
king died, and the project died with him. In the report it
was provided among other reforms, that no son should be
passed over in his father's will unless expressly disinherited,
and such disinherison would not be good unless for just cause.
So also with wives and daughters. These causes were enumerated and follow closely the civil law ; one cause is significant
of the times, wives and children who became heretics might be
passed over (Reeves' History of English Law, Vol. III, p. 5o).
The customs referred to above and the influence of the civil
law are probably the cause of that erroneous but widespread
impression of the necessity of leaving the heir a shilling or
some other express legacy, in order to effectually disinherit
him (Bl. Comm. II., p. 503). A statute of the State of Washington provides, that if children are not mentioned or provided
for in the parent's will, the parent will be presumed to have
died intestate, as far as such children are concerned (Gen.
Stat. Wash., § 1965), The object of the statute is not to
compel a substantial provision for children, but to prevent
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disinheriting through inadvertence: Bower v. Bower, 5 Wash.
225 ; Hill v. Hill, 7 Wash. 409.
Feeling and opinion both in England and America have
been so influenced by the practice of freedom in testamentary
dispositions, that an interference with this practice would be
regarded as an interference with the rights of the individual.
"It is as much the duty of the courts to uphold the right of
the owner of property to dispose of it by will, according to
his pleasure, as to see that he is not imposed upon in the
exercise of that right:" Dumont v. Dumont, 46 N. J. Eq.
223.
Nor does it make any difference from what source
'testator inherited or derived his property: In re Fricke's Will,
19 N. Y. S. 315. The unreasonableness of predjudices or
the unfairness of dispositions, however much they may be the
subject of criticism, however much the product of bad advice
and resentment, cannot alone avail to invalidate a will: Finn's
Fstate, i Misc. Rep. 280; In re Gleespin's Will, 26 N. J. Eq.
523 ; Wintermute v. Wilson, 27 N. J. Eq. 447, 28 N. J. Eq.
437; Dale v. Dale, 36 N. J. Eq. 269; Salisbury v. Aldrich,
118 Ill. 199; Trezeaant v. Rains, 25 S. W. (Tex.), 1092;
Bennett v. Bennett, 26 A. (N. J.), 573 ; Loeser's Estate, 3 Pa.
D. 817.
No matter how flagrantly the testator has violated the
obligations of affection: i re Blair's Will, I6 N. Y. S. 874.
No matter how sudden the change of testamentary disposition: n re Clark's Wi, 23 N. Y. S.712. The omission or
disinheritance of a child is entitled to no weight other than as
a circumstance to be considered with other evidence tending
to show undue influence or want of mental capacity : Smith v.
Harrison, 2 Heisk. 230; Bluoit v.
urrin, 58 Mo. 307"
Where force, fraud or indue influence is used the free agency
of the testator is destroyed and the instrument obviously is
not his will. Want of sufficient mental capacity is the usual
ground for contest in the hundreds of will cases tried every
year in the courts of this country.
To the medical profession insanity is simply "a condition
due to disease of the brain, expressed by impairment of feeling
thought and volition: " Hamilton's System of Legal Medicine,
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Vol. II, p. 39. Confusion and misunderstanding result from
the fact that " insanity" as defined above does not necessarily
-deprive the testator of testamentary power. The question in
-every case is not whether the testator was or was not suffering
from disease of the brain, but whether at the time of executing
.his will he had sufficient intelligence to understand the business in
-which he was engaged, and to know what property he had and
who had claims upon it: Han-ison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. 580;
.Delafieldv. Parrish,25 N. Y. 9; Bulger v. Ross, 98 Ala. 267;
Craig v. Southard, 35 N. E. (Ill.) 36. "It would be unjust,"
-said Judge Cooley, "to deprive a man of the control of his
property as soon as the indications of mental disease appear.
. . . It is with mental health as with physical. A physician discovers evidence of actual or incipient unsoundness in numerous
cases of those who pass with their fellows as persons in perfect
health. For the purpose of treatment this is useful, but for the
.ordinary purposes of life the physician must adopt the same
standard with the rest of the community, and those persons
will be considered in health who pursue their ordinary avocations and discharge the ordinary duties of life without being
incommoded or inconvenienced by physical disorders:"
Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 207. So in the matter of
-Fricke's Will it appeared on autopsy that deceased had tumors
*on his brain, but they were not shown to have affected his
inderstanding: i9 N. Y. S. 315.
Eccentricity of habits, moral depravity, or dissipation, do
--not establish want of capacity: Prentiss v. Bates, 88 Mich.
-567 ; Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 38 N. E. (Ill.) 926 ; Boardinan v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120. Nor the weakness of old
.age: Pike's Estate, 31 N. Y. S. 689; In re Boger's Estate, 31
A., 359; Leeper -r. Taylor, 47 Ala., 221. But see Beaer v.
.Spangler, 61 N. W. (Ia.) 1072. Nor the excessive use of
intoxicating liquors, unless it is shown that the will was made
-during a period when the reason was actually dethroned from
-that cause: In re Jones' lWill, 25 N. Y. S. I o9 ; Peck v. Cary,
77 N. Y. 9; Le-wis' Estate, 14o Pa. 179; Dimonds' Estate, 3
Pa. Dist. 554. So also with the morphine habit: In re Coles'
Will, 49 Wis. 179. It is not necessary to prove that testator
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actually recollected all his property; it is sufficient if he was
-mentally capable of doing so: Kerr v. Lunsford, 31 W. Va.
.659. Nor can it be said, as a matter of law, that because a
person is incapable of transacting ordinary business he is
incapable of making a testamentary disposition of his estate:
Sinnet v. Bowman, 37 N. E. (Ill.) 885; Taylor v. Cox, 38
.N. E. (Ill.) 656; M7ay v. Biddle, 127 Mass. 414; Whitney v.
.Twombly, 136 Mass. 145.
The theory of partial insanity or delusion is of comparaitively modern origin and growth. The term "partial insanity,"
.although frequently used, is unscientific and it is safer to speak
of monomania or paranoia; In the words of Hamilton: "It
-is no more possible for a partial disease of the mind to exist
than for a partial variola or a partial phthisis. It is true that
-certain insanities have limited forms of expression, but I have
iiever seen a case even of paranoia or some of its allied
psychoses, or moral imbecility, where, sooner or later, there
were not, more or less, decided indications of general and
profound intellectual disturbance :" Hamilton, Vol. II, p, 114;
Williams on Executors, Ed. of 1895, p. 30. Monomania or
-paranoiais an insanity in which the mental aberration consists
in the existence of limited delusions that are of a grandiose or
depressed or persecutory nature. In Drew v. Clark, 3 Add.
79, the leading case on this subject, it was held by Sir John
N.icholl that a will,, the direct offspring of insane delusion was
void. In that case a prominent doctor had treated his only
,daughter from her earliest childhood in a manner truly
fiendish and finally disinherited her, although there.was no
reason for such conduct on his part, his daughter being dutiful
and highly regarded by all who knew her.
Some of the English cases carried this doctrine to an
.extreme, holding, that if the testdtor's mind was unsound in
-one particular it was altogether unsound, and, therefore,
incapable of performing a rational act, such as the making of
a will: Waring v. Waring, 6 Moo. P. C. 341. A different
,,doctrine subsequently prevailed, and it is now held that to
-render it invalid the will must be the direct product of the
,delusion : Boughton v. Knight, L. R. 3 P. & D. 64; Smee v.
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Smee, L. R. 5 P. Div. 84. For example, a monomania on
the subject of eating was held not to affect testator's capacity,
to make a will: Jenckes v. Smithfield, 2 R. I. 255. Where,
however, a testator believed that he was a son of George IV,
and under that delusion, made a will leaving his property to a
library at Brighton, a favorite resort of that king, the will
was set aside as the offspring of delusion: Smet v. Smee, L.
R. 5 P. Div. 84. So, also, where testator had delusions of
persecution: Society v. Hopper, 43 Barb. 625; Ballantine v.
Proudfoot, 62 Wis. 216; Edwards v. Davis, 30 W. L. B. (0.).
283. That his family were trying to poison or injure him:
Riggsv. The Society, 95 N. Y. 503. That his wife was unfaithful:
In re Gannons' Will, 2 Misc. Rep. 339; Barbo v. Rider, 67
Wis. 398. Or his child illegitimate: Haines v. Hayden, 54 N.
W. (Mich.) 9 11. And where deceased had suddenly conceived
an intense and unreasoning hatred of a member of the family:
Mfiller v. White, 5 Redf. 320; Merrit v. Rolston, 5 Redf. 220.
In the matter of Lockwood's Will, testator executed an
instrument giving all his property to charity, except a sum to
his executor, "as high as one quarter of the estate, large
enough to be above any bribe that may be offered by my
brothers and sisters for the redemption of this will and the
heirship to my estate." The court said, "I am persuaded that
the alleged will must be rejected, that it is unnatural, unreasonable and strange on its face." 8 N.Y.S. 345. In Carter'sEstate,
I I Pa. C. C. i4O, testator, an accomplished man, fell into a
hypochondriacal condition and excluded from participation in
his estate two daughters, one because of her marriage to a
man against whom he had conceived a sudden, groundless and
unreasoning antipathy, and the other because of her presence
at the ceremony, at the same time reducing the shares of other
children present to life estates. An issue devisavit vel non was
granted on the ground that the evidence, if believed, was sufficient to establish an insane delusion.
On the other hand, if there are facts, however, insufficient,
from which a prejudiced narrow or bigoted mind might derive
a particular idea or belief, it cannot be said that the mind is.
unsound in this respect. The belief may be illogical or pre-
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posterous, but it is not, therefore, evidence of insanity. In re
White's Will, 121 N. Y. 406 ; Coit v. Patcher, 77 N. Y. 533 ;
Estate of Carpenter, 94 Cal. 406. In M1fartin v. Thayer, 37
W. Va. 38, it was developed that testator missing his will from
his papers and unjustly suspecting his gtandchild of taking it
excluded her from a later will. The original will was subsequently founded enclosed in a deed in his box.,' A verdict for
the contestants was set aside, the court saying, that if the testator had testamentary capacity, it was none the less his will,
although he may have been influenced to exclude parties
from sharing in his bounty under a mistaken apprehension of
facts. This question frequently arises where it is alleged that
deceased was subject to a delusion as to the illegitimacy of his
children. "It is conceded," said the court in Potter'v. fones,
"that the conclusions he (the testator) drew from the facts are
wholly unwarrantable and without any justification, indicating
at least an unrelenting jealous disposition, but unjust and
absurd, as they may be, they were not the pure creation of a
perverted imagination without any foundation in reality:" 20
Ore. 245; In re Smith's Will, 24 N. Y. S. 928; Clapp v.
Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 196 Coit v. Patcher, 77 N. Y. 533 ; Cole's
WV~l, 49 Wis. I79; PiliPs v. Cizater, i Dem. 533. The
speculative belief of an individual concerning things natural or
supernatural, no matter how irregular, is not to be regarded as
insanity: Smith's Will, 543; Chafin's Will, 32 Wis. 557;
Bon 2rd's Will, 16 Abb. Pr. 128; Hartwell v. Mcfaster, 4
Redf. 389. It is within very narrow limits that any such
belief can be confidently pronounced a delusion. "The question," it was remarked in Taylor v. Trich, "is not so much
what he believed on these subjects as what effect had his
beliefs on his mental condition :" (165 Pa. 586 at p. 6oo.) If
s.uch beliefs unsettle the judgment and leave the subject under
the influence of a delusion that usurps the reason and controlls the will, then such person has not a sound, disposing
mind and memory: Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369.
As already stated, injustice and inequality in the distribution
of property may be considered in connection with other facts
showing incapacity, as a circumstance tending to show
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unsoundness of mind: Pooler v. Christman, 34 N. E. 57;
Tawney v. Long, 76 Pa. iO6; Bitner v. Bitner, 65 Pa. 347;
Knox v. Knox, ii S. 125; McFadden v. Catron, 25 S. W.
(Mo.) 5o6. To take the question 6f alleged unreasonableness
from the jury is reversible error: Simms v. Russel, 57 N. W.
(Ia.) 6o i; Sherley v. Sherley, 81 Ky. 240. At the same time
it is improper to single it out from the other facts of a case and
instruct specially as to it, thus giving it undue prominence and
tending to mislead the minds of the jury from the real issue
of capacity: Blesdoe v. Blesdoe, I S.W. Io; Burney v. Torrey,
14 S. W. (Ala.) 685. It is only a circumstance and never
regarded as sufficient alone to invalidate a will: Gamble v.
Gamble, 39 Barb. 373. This is particularly true where the
facts suggest a reason for such discrimination as from motives
of gratitude or personal attachment: In re Snelling, 136 N.
Y. 515 ; In re Mondorf, IiO N. Y. 450; or to secure peace
at home, Peery v. Peery, 29 S. W. (Tenn.) I. Or a preference
for children who formed part of the household, or for the
younger children: In re Murray's Estate, I I Pa. C. C. 263;
Nicewanderv. Nicewander,37 N. W. (Ill.) 698. Or a statement
that a child has already been provided for: King v. Holmes,
84 Me. 819. Family discord, unfilial conduct of children,
the separation of husband and wife, are all circumstances to
be carefully considered: Chandler v. Jost, I I S. 636; In re
Suydam's
1ill, 32 N. Y. S. 449.
"A person will be
influenced in the formation of his attachments and prejudices
by his associations, relationship, benefits or injuries. This is
natural and he may, in the exercise of his discretion, dispose
of his property according to his predilections thus formed:"
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 43 Minn. 73 ; Trumbull v. Gibbons, 2 Zab.
117; Lee v. Lee, 4 McCord, 183; AfcDonaldson's Estate, 130
Pa. 48o; Blair v. Cline, 33 P. (Ore.) 542; Barnes v. Barnes,
66 Me. 286; Collins v. Brazil, 63 Ia. 432; Austen v. Graham,
8 Moo. P. C. 4 9 3 ; White v. Driver,I Phill. 84; Foster'sEstate,
142 Pa. 62.
A will cannot be termed inofficious, which disregards the claims of collaterals in favor of a wife: McCann's
Estate, 2 Pa. Dist. 181; Barlo-w v. Waters, 28 S.W. (Ky.)
785; Harwood v. Baker, 6 Moo. P. C. 282. Nor the passing

